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Long plagued by a reputation of corruption and inefficiency in its
criminal justice sector, Mexican criminal procedure is in the process of
an ambitious and aggressive reform. Mexico’s constitutional reforms
began in 2008 and aim to be fully implemented throughout the country
by 2016.1 The reforms are transitioning Mexican criminal procedure
from an inquisitorial system to an oral adversarial system.2 This transition
will be achieved through comprehensive constitutional and statutory
changes at every level of a criminal proceeding: from the initial
investigatory stage, to the trial stage, and finally to sentencing.3
Central to the goals of the reforms, there are now various clear
procedural safeguards in place that protect the due process rights of
Mexican citizens accused of crimes.4 These safeguards aim to ensure a
fair trial for the accused by protecting criminal defendants from possible

1. Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de
la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Decree to reform and amend
provisions of the Mexican Constitution], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 18 de
Junio de 2008 (Mex.).
2. Id.
3. Matthew C. Ingram & David A. Shirk, Judicial Reform in Mexico: Toward a
New Criminal Justice System, 2010 U. SAN DIEGO TRANS-BORDER INST. 1, http://catcher.
sandiego.edu/items/peacestudies/2010-IngraShirk-JRM%20(2).pdf
4. Decree to reform and amend provisions of the Mexican Constitution, supra note 1.
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corruption and abuses of power within the criminal procedural process,
and by preventing violations of their fundamental individual rights.5
Specifically, this Comment will examine and compare these safeguards
within the newly implemented criminal proceedings for the purpose of
proposing an additional procedural safeguard: formally codified rules of
evidence.
In Part I, this Comment begins with a brief history of Mexico’s
political framework, including an introduction to its civil law tradition,
the positivist values present in its legal framework, and the previous
criminal procedure reforms that took place before the current 2008
constitutional reforms.6 It is important to understand the challenges that
the previous—and unsuccessful—constitutional reforms faced in order
to appreciate the drastic scope of the current changes to Mexican
criminal procedure.
Part II will address the role of the United States in its relationship with
Mexico relationship during the implementation of the 2008 constitutional
reforms. As Mexico’s direct neighbor, the United States is in the unique
position of being particularly invested in the implementation of any
changes to the Mexican legal system. While the current Mexican
reforms only address criminal proceedings, it is likely that the United
States would be similarly invested in reforming civil proceedings in light
of increased trade and business dealings between the two countries. The
United States’ own adversarial system, so prominently displayed in
American criminal procedure, will also inevitably influence the new
Mexican adversarial system due to the proximity and involvement between
the two countries. Consequently, the United States plays a significant
role in facilitating the reforms by funding and actively assisting with the
continuing education and training of Mexican citizens and legal
personnel during this transition.
Part III will compare the pre-reform inefficiencies within Mexico’s
criminal procedure under the inquisitorial system with the goals of the
2008 constitutional reforms and introduce how the reforms simultaneously
address the inefficiencies and goals with the implementation of new
5. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
arts. 8–12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
6. Although Mexico is transitioning to an adversarial system, it is not trading its
civil law system for a common law system. Thus, positivism remains an integral Mexican
legal value. See infra Part A.
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safeguards. Notably, although one of the goals of the reform is to ensure
justice and protect a criminal defendant’s basic human rights as mandated
by international standards, the reforms expressly take away the rights of
those criminal defendants accused of participation in organized crime.7
Part IV will propose the implementation of a separately written code
of evidence as an additional safeguard within the scope of the reforms.
The Codes of Criminal Procedure of several Mexican states already
embody many evidentiary principles that are similar to those codified in
the United States Federal Rules of Evidence, but these principles are not
uniform across the codes of different states.8 This section proposes that
the Mexican government formally codify its rules of evidence outside
the code of criminal procedure as a procedural safeguard during evidentiary
determinations to protect the criminally accused from arbitrary or
inconsistent evidentiary standards. This section also explores how formally
codified rules of evidence may evolve either under Mexico’s positivist
legal framework or under the indirect influence of the United States.
Part V contains a comparative analysis of Mexico’s transition to an
adversarial system to that of Chile, another Latin American country that
successfully transitioned from an inquisitorial system despite a similar
civil law framework. Like Mexico, one of the primary goals of Chile’s
reform was to prevent human rights violations in its criminal proceedings.9
However, Chile’s reform is considered successful even though it did not
formalize its rules of evidence.10 Thus, this section will examine the
similarities and differences between the countries that led to their reforms,
while taking into consideration that a comparable country that successfully
transitioned to an adversarial system nevertheless fulfilled the goals of
its reform without formally codifying its rules of evidence.

7. William Hine-Ramsberger, Drug Violence and Constitutional Revisions: Mexico’s
2008 Criminal Justice Reform and the Formation of Rule of Law, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
292, 302 (2011).
8. While each state within the United States has its own state code of evidence, their
evidentiary principles are similar enough to be considered uniform for the purposes of
this Comment.
9. See Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino, Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems:
The Rule of Law and Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 SW. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 323, 324–25 (1998).
10. See Cristián Riego, Oral Procedures and Case Management: The Innovations
of Chile’s Reform, 24 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 339, 341 (2007).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MEXICO’S POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Mexico’s Civil Law Tradition and Inherent Positivism
Like most Latin American countries transitioning to an adversarial
system, Mexico’s inquisitorial system derives from the civil law tradition
retained after Spanish imperialist rule.11 Unlike a common law system, a
civil law system is positivist in nature, governed by the idea that legal
authority originates directly and solely from the enactment of laws.12
Mexican courts are not bound by legal precedent, the driving force of the
common law system, until that precedent is subsequently written into the
civil law codes.13 As a result, Mexico’s legal system is positivist because
inherent rights are not guaranteed to Mexican citizens unless those rights
are formally codified in the Mexican Constitution.14 Mexico’s inherent
positivism in relation to the current reforms is further explored in Part IV
of this Comment.
Previous reforms to Mexico’s constitution, however, also reflected its
positivist foundation. For example, Mexico’s first post-independence
constitution of 1824 was heavily influenced by the United States
Constitution, but conspicuously lacked the guaranteed individual rights
afforded in the United States Constitution until later reforms made to the
Mexican Constitution in 1857.15 Consequently, Mexican citizens could
not demand for recognition of their individual rights until those rights
were explicitly written into the constitution.16
Like the current 2008 constitutional reforms, the post-revolution
constitution of 1917 may have similarly intended to protect basic human
rights by reforming Mexican criminal procedure to constitutionally

11. See Jorge A. Vargas, An Introductory Lesson to Mexican Law: From Constitutions
and Codes to Legal Culture and NAFTA, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1337, 1342 (2004); see
also Hine-Ramsberger, supra note 7, at 293.
12. See Paul J. Zwier & Alexander Barney, Moving to an Oral Adversarial System
in Mexico: Jurisprudential, Criminal Procedure, Evidence Law, and Trial
Advocacy Implications, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 189, 193 (2012).
13. See id.
14. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended,
art. 1, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
15. Vargas, supra note 11, at 1343.
16. Interestingly, although the 1917 Mexican Constitution provided a positive framework
by guaranteeing individual rights, these guarantees appear largely ignored. See Carlos
Rios Espinoza, Redesigning Mexico’s Criminal Procedure: The States’ Turning Point, 15
SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 53, 56–57 (2008).
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guarantee needed criminal rights.17 Under a positivist context, however,
this Constitution did not guarantee inherent individual rights to Mexican
citizens. Instead, the Constitution arguably offered the rights that it was
willing to give to its citizens by statutorily defining how it would treat its
citizens.18
B. Reforms to the 1917 Constitution
The 1917 Mexican Constitution and its subsequent reforms established an
adversarial system, one that addressed many of the same goals of the
2008 reforms and included procedural safeguards similar to those of the
United States.19 Unfortunately, this Constitution and its reforms were
largely ignored due to the political turmoil surrounding the end of the
Mexican Revolution and were never actually implemented into Mexican
criminal procedure.20 As a result, Mexican criminal procedure continued
with its inquisitorial system until the current 2008 constitutional reforms
by President Calderón.21
In 2004, President Vicente Fox first proposed federal reforms to the
criminal justice system to facilitate a move towards an adversarial model.22
Although he was ultimately unable to pass these reforms through the
legislature due to lack of political support and political resistance, President
Fox is nevertheless credited with prompting the initial state level reforms
towards an adversarial system.23 For example, between 2004 and 2008,
several Mexican states began implementing oral adversarial procedures
into their criminal proceedings following the announcement of President
Fox’s proposed reforms, which included oral arguments in public
courtrooms. 24 Remarkably, the first oral adversarial trial took place in
2005 in the city of Montemorelos, two years before the 2008 Calderón

17. See Espinoza, supra note 16, at 55–56.
18. Zwier & Barney, supra note 12, at 198.
19. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended,
art. 20, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.) (listing safeguards
such as the right to confrontation, proper notice, a public jury trial, and bail).
20. Espinoza, supra note 16, at 56. In 1934, the legislature passed enabling legislation
that contemplated the principles in the 1917 Constitution. Id. This enabling legislation,
however, was defective and reflected a disparity between the Constitution’s principles and the
criminal procedure legislation. Id. at 56–57.
21. See id. at 56–57; see also Zachary J. Lee, Wrestling with Criminal Procedure:
How Law Schools in United States and Mexico Can Team Up to Rebuild Mexico’s Criminal
Trial, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 55, 61–63 (2010).
22. Ingram & Shirk, supra note 3, at 8.
23. Id.; Lee, supra note 21, at 64.
24. See Lee, supra note 21, at 63–65.
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constitutional reforms requiring oral trials were officially adopted by
Mexican Congress.25
Unlike the reforms proposed by the Fox administration, the reforms
proposed under the administration of President Felipe Calderón were
widely supported and quickly adopted in 2008, perhaps in response to
the rising violence and corruption as a result of Mexico’s drug war.26
These current constitutional reforms primarily sought to improve the
criminal justice system in response to Mexico’s drug war and the high
levels of violence from organized crime syndicates, restore the public’s
confidence in the legal system, and remedy the rampant human rights
violations occurring during criminal proceedings as mandated by
international standards.27
These aggressive constitutional reforms require all Mexican states to
adopt new criminal procedures to reflect the new oral adversarial system
by 2016.28 Per the constitutional reforms, Mexico must: sufficiently
train all Mexican legal professionals in oral advocacy so that they may
successfully partake in the new system, implement procedural safeguards at
all levels of a criminal proceeding in order to protect the newly
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the criminally accused, and
separately address those accused of organized crime within the criminal
justice system.29 These reforms will be further examined in more detail
in Part IV of this Comment.
II. INFLUENCE AND INVOLVEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES
Inevitably, Mexico’s adversarial system will be exposed to and
influenced by the United States’ adversarial system, due to the proximity,
accessibility, and the direct involvement between the two countries. As
a direct neighbor, the United States is naturally invested in aiding Mexico
with any changes to its legal system, as such changes may directly or
indirectly impact the United States. For instance, in light of the proximity
25. Id. at 63–64.
26. See Ingram & Shirk, supra note 3, at 8; see also Ronald F. Wright, Mexican Drug
Violence and Adversarial Experiments, 35 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 364–69 (2010).
27. See Ingram & Shirk, supra note 3, at 8; see also Wright, supra note 26, at 364–
69.
28. Decree to reform and amend provisions of the Mexican Constitution, supra
note 1, segundo transitorio.
29. Decree to reform and amend provisions of the Mexican Constitution, supra
note 1, art. 20.
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between the two countries and the threat of a potential violent spillover
from Mexico’s drug war into the United States, it is logical that the
United States would also be invested in facilitating reforms that would
create an efficient Mexican criminal procedure.30
The United States funds the implementation of Mexico’s criminal
justice reforms partly in self-interest, in order to tackle organized crime
and drug trafficking before those problems cross the border. For example,
the United States actively assists in funding the implementation of
Mexico’s 2008 reforms through the Mérida Initiative, a $1.4 billion foreign
aid package providing assistance to Mexico and other Central American
countries to combat against drug crime.31 Additionally, fifteen percent
of Mérida funding to Mexico is contingent on Mexico’s meeting certain
requirements regarding human rights conditions.32 These requirements
are determined by an annual United States State Department human rights
progress report.33 Thus, the United States is essentially compelling Mexico
to address its human rights violations within its criminal reforms.
Most Mérida programs are currently administered by two federal
agencies: the United States State Department and the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID).34 USAID in turn funds Proderecho,
an agency designated to oversee the reform successfully implemented in
each Mexican state.35 Successful implementation requires successful
standardization, which in turn requires changes to current legal education in
Mexico.36 Because the concept of an adversarial system is completely
novel to pre-transition Mexican legal professionals, current practicing legal
professionals must be retrained at every level of criminal procedure.
Additionally, it must also overcome any possible resistance by established
legal professionals who have spent their lives practicing without oral
advocacy and may naturally not see a need for it, despite the mandatory
reforms.
Continuous education and training is imperative to the success of the
reform, as Mexican legal professionals cannot look to previous groundwork
within Mexico’s own legal history. Mexican judges, court employees,

30. See CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE & JUNE S. BEITTEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40135,
MÉRIDA INITIATIVE FOR MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA: FUNDING AND POLICY ISSUES 1
(2010); see also Wright, supra note 26, at 368–69.
31. SEELKE & BEITTEL, supra note 30, at 1.
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id. at 9–10. As recent as 2009, Amnesty International and other human rights
groups have called for an unfavorable report due to the Mexican government’s failure to
address human rights violations committed by the military. Id. at 22–23.
34. Id. at 17.
35. Wright, supra note 26, at 375.
36. See Lee, supra note 21, at 68.
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police officers, law students, and existing attorneys must all be trained to
effectively play their part in oral advocacy proceedings.37 The United
States inevitably exerts an indirect influence on Mexican criminal procedure
by playing a significant role in facilitating Mexico’s reforms through its
personal investment in Mexico’s criminal justice system and active
assistance in the transition to an adversarial system.
III. PRE-REFORM INEFFICIENCIES IN MEXICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AND HOW THE 2008 REFORMS ADDRESS THESE
WITH SAFEGUARDS
Under its inquisitorial system, Mexican criminal procedure was inefficient,
corrupt, and lacked transparency.38 Consequently, Mexican citizens had
little confidence in the fairness of their criminal justice system.39 However,
despite the fact that Mexico’s positivist framework does not acknowledge
the existence of fundamental individual rights outside of those codified
within its constitution, Mexico has signed multiple international agreements
that have identified inherent human rights.40 These include the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR), and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).41
Together, these international agreements mandate the following
fundamental rights for the accused: the presumption of innocence, the
right to a timely trial, the right to an oral trial held before a neutral judge
or jury, the right to remain silent, the right to counsel, the right to challenge
evidence and confront witnesses, congruency between the charges and
the verdict, and the exclusionary rule.42 In the transition to an adversarial
system, the new reforms are intended to protect against Mexican criminal
procedure’s previous shortcomings, in addition to protecting the fundamental
individual rights mandated by international human rights organizations
and treaties.
37. Wright, supra note 29, at 376.
38. Zwier & Barney, supra note 12, at 189.
39. Hine-Ramsberger, supra note 7, at 292.
40. Gonzalo Reyes Salas, Guidelines to Reform Mexican Criminal Procedure, 15
SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 53, 95 (2008).
41. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 5; see also International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5; American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 21, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143.
42. Reyes Salas, supra note 40, at 95.
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A. Checks and Balances in an Oral Adversarial System
An oral adversarial system addresses Mexico’s lack of transparency
by allowing both parties to present their arguments and evidence in the
court during trial.43 In Mexico’s previous inquisitorial system, the role
of the public prosecutor was virtually unconstrained in that he or she was
free to lead the investigation alongside investigatory police and gather
evidence against the criminally accused without meaningful judicial
supervision.44 This complete lack of oversight opened the door to severe
abuses of power by the prosecutor, including forced confessions by torture
and illegally obtained evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible,
but could nevertheless be used at trial to convict the defendant.45
The new adversarial system boosts the role of the public defender to
match that of the public prosecutor.46 The defense counsel’s more active
role against the public prosecutor in the new adversarial system directly
benefits the criminally accused because the checks and balances that arise
from the regular competition between the two opposing parties at trial
act as a safeguard against any abuse of power by either party.47 Similarly,
the introduction of a due process judge to oversee the admissibility of
evidence before the trial also keeps the prosecution in check, by limiting
the previously unfettered power of the prosecutor and acting as a safeguard
against any abuses of power or injustices during the investigatory stage.48
B. Presumption of Innocence
Before the 2008 reforms, those accused of crimes were treated as
criminals prior to their verdict, due to the use of preventative detentions—
arraigos—in which criminal defendant detainees awaited their verdicts
in jail.49 Pre-trial detainees essentially lost their freedom before they
were even convicted and were negligently mixed with the general criminal
prison population during this period regardless of whether or not the
criminal defendant’s offense was a severe or minor crime.50 This was
largely the norm, though it violated a criminal defendant’s basic right
against arbitrary detention, as determined by international agreements.
43. Ingram & Shirk, supra note 3, at 10.
44. Id. at 9.
45. Id. at 12–13.
46. See Ingram & Shirk, supra note 3, at 13.
47. Id. at 13, 15. On a practical note, while the public defender now theoretically
acts as an “adversary” to the public prosecutor, the prosecutor may have difficulty adjusting to
his or her newly diminished role. See id.
48. See id. at 12.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 17.

434

DANG (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE)

[VOL. 15: 425, 2014]

1/26/2018 1:57 PM

Codified Rules of Evidence
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

In 2009, President Calderón enacted an order establishing a presumption
of innocence for criminal defendants at all stages of a criminal proceeding.51
This presumption of innocence restored the criminal defendant’s
fundamental human right against arbitrary pre-trial detention.52 Under
the reforms, only criminal defendants who are suspected of committing
violent crimes or those who pose a threat to society could be preventatively
detained.53 Thus, this new presumption of innocence created safeguards
against the violation of the basic human rights of the criminally accused.
C. Police and Law Enforcement Reforms at the Investigatory Stage
The new police reforms target the investigatory stage of Mexican
criminal procedure. Previously, only designated “investigatory” police
had a duty to gather evidence in criminal proceedings, whereas “preventative”
police agencies were only accountable for the prevention of crime.54
Under the 2008 reforms, the two separate agencies merged their duties
so that all police agencies will play an expanded role in the investigatory
stage.55 Currently, the police agencies are responsible for protecting and
gathering evidence in addition to their general duties of crime prevention.56
These procedural safeguards arose as a natural and direct result of the
implementation of the new adversarial system.57 To begin with, an
adversarial system provides a stronger criminal defense for the accused,
which in turn requires proper fact-finding and evidence gathering.58 The
evidence found at the investigatory stage is typically used against the
criminally accused during the subsequent trial stage.59 Accordingly, it is

51. Nota Informativa, Presidencia de la República, Firma el Presidente Felipe
Calderón Decreto de Reforma Constitucional en Materia de Justicia Penal y Seguridad
Pública (June 17, 2008), available at http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/2008/06/firma
el-presidente-felipe-calderon-decreto-de-reforma-constitucional-en-materia-de-justicia
penal-y-seguridad-publica/; see also Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos
[C.P.], , as amended, art. 20, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917
(Mex.).
52. Reyes Salas, supra note 39, at 94–95.
53. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended,
art. 17, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
54. Ingram & Shirk, supra note 3, at 13–14.
55. Id. at 14.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 13–15.
58. See id. at 11–13.
59. See id at 13–14.

435

DANG (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE)

1/26/2018 1:57 PM

particularly important that there are safeguards to ensure that the police
agencies follow procedure during the initial investigatory stage. Although
Mexico currently lacks evidence rules that dictate the handling of evidence,
the admissibility of gathered evidence during trial, and the illegality of
evidence obtained in a certain way—it seems natural that evidentiary
standards will evolve as the police agency’s role in gathering evidence
simultaneously evolves.
D. Protection Against Torture and Coerced Confessions
Mexico’s 2008 constitutional reforms explicitly forbid the use of
torture against criminal defendants in response to disapproval by human
rights organizations.60 One of the human rights violations unfortunately
tolerated during Mexico’s inquisitorial system was the use of torture to
extract false confessions from the criminally accused.61 The confession
would then be used at trial as evidence against the accused, often
independently convicting the criminal defendant without corroborative
evidence.62 These unfortunate procedures accounted for the public’s
widespread association of unfairness with the Mexican criminal justice
system. To combat this injustice and to renew the public’s faith in the
fair treatment of criminal defendants, the new reforms specifically prohibit
the use of torture within the language of the new criminal proceedings.63
The state of Chihuahua’s Code of Criminal Procedure, for example,
states that “[e]vidence that has been obtained through torture, threats or
violation of a person’s fundamental rights will have no value.”64
Furthermore, as a safeguard against using illicitly gained confessions
as evidence, the reforms mandate that a criminal defendant’s confession
can only be obtained in the presence of the criminal defendant’s defense
attorney.65 This ensures that the accused is never coerced into confessing
to a crime without being first advised by his or her attorney, who also
serves as a witness if the accused chooses to confess.66 This also prevents

60. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], , as amended,
art. 20(A)(II), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
61. Ingram & Shirk, supra note 3, at 13.
62. Id.
63. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended,
art. 20(B)(II), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
64. Código de Procedimientos Penales del Estado de Chihuahua [CPPC]
[Criminal Procedure Code of the State of Chihuahua], as amended, art. 19, Diario Oficial
de la Federación [DO], 11 de Junio de 2006 (Mex.).
65. See Código Federal de Procedimientos Penales [CFPP] [Federal Criminal
Procedure Code], as amended, art. 296, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 30 de
Agosto de 1934 (Mex.); see also CPPC art. 124 (Mex.).
66. See Wright, supra note 29, at 373–74.
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the prosecution from relying solely on the confession, and no additional
evidence to convict the criminal defendant at trial, as condoned by the
previous system.67
E. Corruption within the Criminal Justice System
Part of the 2008 criminal reforms expressly limits the due process
rights of those suspected of participating in organized crime in order to
combat any corruption instigated by the drug cartels.68 The cartels have
had a successful history of bribing law enforcement and political officials to
enable themselves to continue engaging in illegal activities.69 Those law
enforcement and political officials who refused bribes faced violent
repercussions or were coerced into participation.70 Thus, the drastic reform
decreases the amount of corruption within the criminal proceedings to
combat the proliferation of violence from drug cartels and drug trafficking.71
Ironically, this approach actually results in fewer safeguards for criminal
defendants accused of participating in organized crime and offers a less
than fair trial for those particular defendants than defendants accused of
other crimes.72 As part of the new reforms, these criminal defendants
can have their constitutionally guaranteed rights taken away from them
without any cause.73 They may also be legally subjected to arbitrary and
lengthy preventative detentions, forced into solitary confinement, and
prevented from communicating with the outside world.74 These reforms
are problematic in that they condone the violation of the fundamental
human rights of a certain class of criminal defendants—those accused of
organized crime—despite the fact that the 2008 constitutional reforms
are meant to ensure safeguards for the purpose of protecting generally
accused defendants from violations of these same fundamental rights.75
67. Id.
68. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended,
art. 16, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
69. See Hine-Ramsberger, supra note 7, at 302; see also Wright, supra note 26, at
365–66; see also Catalina Pérez Correa, Distrust and Disobedience: Discourse and Practice
of Law in Mexico, 77 REVISTA JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE P.R. 345, 355 (2008).
70. Lee, supra note 21, at 56.
71. Hine-Ramsberger, supra note 7, at 302.
72. Id.
73. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended,
art. 16, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
74. Id.
75. Hine-Ramsberger, supra note 7, at 302.
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However, keeping in mind that another distinct goal of the 2008
constitutional reforms was to specifically combat the reality of drug
trafficking and violence due to organized crime, the appropriateness of
these reforms must be examined in a different context.76 In direct response
to the corruption caused by the drug cartels, which in turn perpetuate the
idea of rampant injustice within Mexican criminal procedure, different
standards may be necessarily justified to treat those accused of participating
in organized crime in comparison to those accused of committing other
crimes.
F. Assignment of Judges at Every Stage of the Trial
The new reforms divide the trial process among three separate judges
for each stage of criminal procedure: a due process judge, an oral trial
judge, and a sentencing judge.77 The goal of utilizing a separate judge
for each stage is to safeguard the accused from any conflicts of interest
or biases that each judge could develop during one stage of the criminal
proceeding that could carry over to another stage of the criminal proceeding.78
This procedure also promotes judicial efficiency by streamlining the
process, as each judge will only specialize in his or her own stage of
criminal procedure.79
By only moderating over his or her assigned stage, the judges will not
be influenced by what other rulings occurred before and after that stage.80
Thus, the due process judge will rule only on pre-trial determinations,
particularly regarding evidence that may be utilized in the trial phase.81
The oral trial judge will rule according to the evidence and arguments
presented at trial, but will not know which evidence, if any, might have
been excluded with or without cause by the due process judge.82 Similarly,
the sentencing judge will sentence the criminal defendant based only on
the knowledge that the defendant was convicted of a particular crime at
the oral trial and use only that knowledge to apply a proper sentence.83

76. Notably, while this creates a class of defendants whose basic human rights are
clearly violated, it does not impact the human rights contingency of Mérida funding due
to the United States interest in combating the drug war. Id.
77. Ingram & Shirk, supra note 3, at 11.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 10–11.
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Each judge has sole discretion over his or her own particular stage in the
criminal proceeding.84
Furthermore, the role of the due process judge itself is a significant
safeguard against any inadequacies of every level of criminal proceeding
leading up to the oral trial. The due process judge essentially guarantees
that the oral trial judge will act as a neutral third party by ensuring that
the oral trial judge can impartially weigh the evidence and arguments
without being tainted by previous evidentiary determinations. In this
way, the oral trial judge functions in a role very much like that of a jury
in a United States criminal proceeding, in that the due process judge
determines what the oral trial judge, like a jury, may or may not consider
upon applying the law to the facts.85
However, though it appears that the due process judge functions as a
safeguard by himself or herself as part of the three-judge trial process,
the due process judge nevertheless requires an additional safeguard—
which is examined in the next section.
IV. AN ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARD: CODIFIED RULES OF EVIDENCE
Formally written rules of evidence make sense in light of Mexico’s civil
law tradition and reform goals. Presently, the due process judge—juez
de garantía—is the only safeguard against the mishandling or inclusion
of inappropriate evidence. The new criminal procedure only mandates
that the due process judge use his or her own judgment and experience
in making an evidentiary determination.86 In the State of Chihuahua’s
Code of Criminal Procedure, for example, the only written guideline
regarding how the due process judge should rule on the exclusion of
evidence is as follows:
After examining the evidence presented and listening to the parties at the
hearing, the judge will issue an order, based on law, stating what materials will be
excluded from evidence, including that [evidence] which is clearly irrelevant,

84. Although not explored, using specialized judges may also act as an internal or
institutional corruption from within the judicial system.
85. The role of the jury, which figures so prominently in the United States adversarial
system, does not exist within Mexico’s current adversarial system. See generally Hiroshi
Fukurai & Richard Krooth, The Establishment of All-Citizen Juries as a Key Component
of Mexico’s Judicial Reform: Cross-National Analyses of Lay Judge Participation and
the Search for Mexico’s Judicial Sovereignty, 16 TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL’Y 37 (2010).
86. See CPPC art. 314 (Mex.).
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that which has as its purpose to validate open and notorious acts, and that which
is inadmissible under this code.87

The language clearly indicates that the due process judge is not statutorily
mandated to do anything other than issue an order “based on law.”88
This in turn implies that the judge is free to make a determination however
he or she sees fit, as the only other provision guiding the evaluation of
evidence generally requires that “[j]udges will evaluate the evidence in
accord with [the principles] of sound criticism, observing rules of logic,
science, and the maxims of experience.”89 As a result, different judges will
use their different discretions to subjectively evaluate evidence.90
Because the due process judge is not bound by any other guidelines, it
follows that pre-trial evidentiary hearings are determined wholly at the
discretion and judgment of one person. Each due process judge is free to
make judgment calls without establishing any standard of consistency,
neither across the states nor between each of that judge’s own individual
determinations. Even on appeal, the due process judge’s decisions could
not be reversed so long as the judge theoretically made his or her decision
within his or her “judgment,” which would satisfy the broad guideline of
the statutory text.91 Therefore, there is a need for an additional safeguard at
this stage to ensure that evidence is presented fairly at the trial stages,
and codified rules of evidence would serve this purpose.
A. Formally Codified Rules of Evidence Provide Consistency, Further
Transparency and Fairness, and Prevent Potential Abuses
of Power by the Due Process Judge
First, providing consistency between the evidence rules of each state is
valuable in that it creates a practical standard that a criminal defendant
can rely on, regardless of where and when that criminal defendant goes
to court. While various evidentiary principles exist in the present Mexican
code of criminal procedure, these principles are not uniform across the
states, nor are they easily identified as explicit rules.92

87. Id.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. CFPP art. 485 (Mex.).
92. See, e.g., CFPP art. 220 (Mex.) (guiding expert testimony); CFPP art. 242
(Mex.) (guiding witness testimony); CFPP 269 (Mex.) (guiding the use of private and
public documents); CPPC art. 362 (Mex.) (mandating that a party may not ask leading
questions to an expert witness); CPPC art. 365 (Mex.) (mandating how a defendant may
read a document to refresh his or her memory at trial to overcome contradictions).
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Codified rules of evidence further the 2008 reform’s goal of transparency,
by allowing those accused of crimes to compare a due process judge’s
evidentiary determinations to the statutory rules that would be available
to the public through a formal code of evidence. Consequently, the due
process judge would be forced to abide by an evidentiary standard, creating
a system of checks and balances. Applying the same evidentiary standards
from court to court ensures that every criminal defendant will be treated
substantially the same, if not equally, which also instills a sense of fairness
into criminal proceedings. Furthermore, a formal written code of evidence
provides a safeguard against any possible abuses of power by the due
process judge by creating a viable appeals process for unjust determinations.93
Thus, not only must the judge act according to the statutory law, the
judge must do so knowing that his or her interpretation of the law in
making an evidentiary determination can be easily reviewed against the
codified guidelines in a written code if the decision were to be contested
on appeal.
Some evidence principles found in the Chihuahua Code of Criminal
Procedure are reminiscent of, though not equivalent to, established
principles in the United States Federal Rules of Evidence.94 While the
Chihuahua code sometimes reflects these principles, they are ultimately
only vaguely established in comparison to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The concept of relevance, for example, is complex and significantly
developed within the Federal Rules of Evidence as it spells out the step
by-step test that a judge must adhere to in determining whether the evidence
at hand is admissible.95
To illustrate, Rule 401 in the Federal Rules of Evidence states that
“[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.”96 Rule 402 builds upon Rule
401 so that even relevant evidence is inadmissible in a criminal trial if
prohibited by statutory provision, legislation, common law precedent, or
other rules of evidence within the Federal Rules of Evidence that

93. Like the public prosecutor of the previous inquisitorial system, whose sole
discretion during the investigatory stage was susceptible to gross abuses of power, the
juez de garantía is similarly susceptible to abusing his or her discretion when unchecked.
94. See generally FED. R. EVID. 401–03.
95. See id.
96. FED. R. EVID. 401.
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develop this concept of relevancy.97 Rule 403 defines admissible relevant
evidence by excluding evidence that is “outweighed by a danger of one
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.”98
By contrast, the language in Article 314 of the Chihuahua Code of
Criminal Procedure only generally states that the judge will exclude
evidence “which is clearly irrelevant. . .”99 Thus, the principle that evidence
must be relevant to be presented at trial is clearly as important to Mexico’s
new criminal procedure as it is to the United States criminal procedure,
but is not yet defined or developed. In its current form, the Mexican
evidence principle of relevancy is problematic because it once again
gives the judge complete discretion without further established guidelines or
safeguards against potential bias. Although the Mexican criminal justice
system would not necessarily need its evidence principles to be as complex
or detailed as that of the United States Federal Rules of Evidence, a
formal code of evidence would fully incorporate and set the stage for
further development and customization of concepts such as relevancy.100
B. Implementing Codified Rules of Evidence Works in Conjunction with
Mexico’s Civil Law Tradition and Does Not Conflict with
Mexico’s Positivist Values
Second, Mexico retains its civil law tradition, which reflects its
positivist values.101 Positivism derives from the idea that legal authority
can only originate from enacted laws and statutory designations, as opposed
to the idea of innate or inherent natural laws.102 There is nothing naturalistic
about a statutory code, for example, which is merely created and administered
by a society.103 The Mexican Constitution states that privileges and
immunities must be “granted” by the Constitution to be recognized and

97. FED. R. EVID. 401–02.
98. FED. R. EVID. 403.
99. CPPC art. 314 (Mex.).
100. Similar evidence principles exist in the Chihuahua code, such as Article 272
(regarding the preservation of evidence) and Article 297 (regarding expert testimony).
See CPPC arts. 272, 297.
101. Despite the influences by the United States in Mexico’s transition to an
adversarial system with these reforms, it is significant to keep in mind that Mexico is not
transitioning to a common law system.
102. Zwier & Barney, supra note 12, at 193.
103. Mexican legal education reflects its positivist values in that schools promote
the memorization of the black letter law due to the sole importance of the statutory code.
Robert Kossick, The Rule of Law and Development in Mexico, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 715, 731 (2004).
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that “[s]uch privileges and immunities shall not be restricted or suspended,
but in the cases and under the conditions established by the Constitution
itself.”104 In light of this, the best way to implement an evidentiary standard
is to codify it into Mexican law, giving it the weight to be enforceable.
This would likely lead Mexico to develop a complex code of evidence
similar to that of the United States Federal Rules of Evidence. While the
Mexican code of evidence would not start out as complex as the Federal
Rules of Evidence in this hypothetical, it would gradually build upon the
statutory code and slowly develop the intricacies of the United States
code. The Federal Rules of Evidence codified the totality of its common
law evidence rules simultaneously, after years of the evidence rules
developing and exiting through the case law of individual states.105
In contrast, the Mexican code of evidence would be compelled to
periodically build upon its statutory framework by codifying any major
precedent that it wanted to incorporate as a standard.106 In a civil law
system, a precedent cannot be applied as law until it is formally codified.107
Unlike a common law system, a civil law system cannot use its judiciary
to create law through precedent.108 Instead, a civil law system must codify
its common law into a statutory framework in order for it to be legally
recognized.109 Thus, every relevant legal precedent regarding an evidence
principle would necessarily need to be formally designated as a rule—
which in turn would contribute to a very detailed formal code of evidence.
It follows that codified rules of evidence would not conflict with
Mexico’s positivist values. Rather, positivism strongly supports the
implementation of a written code in favor of evidentiary principles that
are regularly applied, but not contained into the law within written codes.

104. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended,
art. 1, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
105. 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5001 (2d ed. 2005).
106. As an alternative, Mexico could wait to implement a complex code of evidence at
once rather than building up statutory rules.
107. Alfred W. Cortese Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, Civil Justice Reform in America:
A Question of Parity with Our International Rivals, 13 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 1, 19
(1992).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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C. Influence on Mexico by the United States by Proximity for
Economic and Political Reasons
Lastly, Mexico should codify its own rules of evidence due to the
substantial influence resulting from its unique relationship with the
United States and the significant role that the United States plays in
assisting with Mexico’s transition to an adversarial system. Although
Mexico has previously looked to the United States for guidance in
developing its past constitutions, it is nonetheless suspicious of any
American interference in Mexican affairs.110 Thus, it may be difficult
for Mexico to embrace a formal code of evidence similar to that of the
United States Federal Rules of Evidence on the basis of United States
influence alone.111 Instead, Mexico should consider the practical and
economic reasons that will inevitably influence its courts, and how a
formal code of evidence would help serve those reasons.
Legislative history suggests that Mexico has always intended to look
to the United States’ legal framework for guidance.112 Both the 1824
and 1917 Mexican Constitutions used the United States Constitution as a
model.113 While this is certainly not enough to suggest that the reforms
set out to bring Mexican criminal procedure in sync with the United
States criminal justice system, it indicates that Mexico is at least not
opposed to implementing established American legal concepts into its
own developing framework to further the goals of its reform. Therefore,
while Mexico may not elect for the complexity of the United States
Federal Rules of Evidence, it may nevertheless look to the success of a
uniform code of evidence and incorporate nothing else but that concept
alone.114
1. A Formal Code of Evidence for the Sake of Mexican Criminal
Proceedings Would Impact Any Future Reforms to
Mexican Civil Proceedings
By its proximity, the United States will always exert more than influence
by any other foreign country on Mexico’s legal system. Accordingly,
geography must be viewed as a substantial contributing factor to the

110. See Lee, supra note 20, at 66.
111. This type of influence is sometimes more unflatteringly referred to as
“Americanization.” See Vargas, supra note 11, at 1365–67.
112. See id. at 1344–45, 1365.
113. See id.
114. Alternatively, Mexico could borrow a legal concept and rework it to successfully
address its unique needs.
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growing economic relationship between the two countries.115 This in
turn contributes to any resulting influence by the United States, which
gradually and practically develops over the course of countless legal
transactions that occur across the border through continuous trade and
business interactions.116
Two events, for example, have already started the “Americanization”
of Mexican Law: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and Mexico’s Foreign Investment Act of 1993.117 These events opened
the door to foreign influence, by both the United States and other foreign
countries, on Mexico’s legal system in order to facilitate growing trade
and business interactions.118 The implementation of NAFTA, in particular,
quickly transformed Mexico’s legal framework so that it could complement
the framework of NAFTA, as determined by the United States.119 By
the 1990s, Mexican law schools began to incorporate the study of United
States law into their curricula.120 Although Mexico did not purposely
bring its legal system closer in sync with the United States’ legal system,
it nevertheless did so indirectly when it purposely brought its legal system
closer in sync with NAFTA.121
These increased business dealings between the two countries highlight
the need for a uniform code of evidence to standardize civil evidence
determinations in Mexican courts. Safeguards in civil proceedings,
although not as indispensable as in criminal proceedings when a defendant’s
liberty is at stake, are still necessary if Mexico were to later reform its
civil courts to also incorporate oral advocacy. Currently, the transition
to an adversarial system only applies to criminal procedure. Although
the 2008 constitutional reforms primarily address reforms to Mexican
criminal proceedings, it is still likely that any formalized code of
evidence would be created generally and forward-looking enough to be

115. Vargas, supra note 11, at 1339–40.
116. Id. at 1366.
117. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M 289 (1993); see also Ley de Inversión [LIEX] [Foreign Investment Act], Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DO], 27 de Diciembre de 1993 (Mex.).
118. See Vargas, supra note 11, at 1339.
119. Id. at 1367.
120. See Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems:
The Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 401, 424 (1995).
121. Interestingly, unlike Mexico, Canada specifically worried about cultural dominance
by the United States when it entered NAFTA negotiations. Vargas, supra note 11, at
1368.
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applicable to both civil and criminal trials. Opponents in a civil trial are
just as likely to need procedural safeguards regulating the evidence
presented against them by the opposing party.
The increasing economic relations between the two countries make it
natural that the United States’ self interest in Mexico’s legal system may
follow in a later effort to help reform Mexico’s civil proceedings so that
businesses could expect a consistent civil proceeding irrespective of the
country in which they happen to conduct their business. Arguably, formally
codifying rules of evidence in the present could greatly facilitate trade
and business dealings between the United States and Mexico, in addition
to facilitating any projected reform to Mexican civil courts.
2. Shared Objectives Between the United States and Mexico During
This Transition in Light of the Political Climate Make It
Inevitable That Some American Evidentiary
Principles will be Incorporated
For now, the United States is primarily focused on controlling the
spillover effects of the drug war across the border. The two countries
already work together in certain criminal proceedings. In particular,
Mexico currently extradites many of its drug suspects to the United
States for trial.122 A formal code of evidence, especially one that was
predominantly influenced by the United States Federal Rules of Evidence,
would greatly assist in the prosecution of criminal defendants—specifically
those involved in drug trafficking or organized crime, by ensuring against
the misuse of evidence regardless of the country in which the defendant
is prosecuted. Addressing those members of the drug cartels who would
otherwise be prosecuted in the United States and adding a safeguard that
would apply to all criminal defendants would in turn fulfill the goals of
both the 2008 constitutional reforms and those of the Mérida Initiative.
Consequently, the inevitable influence from proximity once again comes
into play, as Mexico’s national security concerns, combined with the
goals of Mérida funding, is likely to bring its criminal reforms even
further in sync with United States criminal procedure.123
The Mérida Initiative directly funds the United States’ involvement
with Mexico’s transition to an adversarial system.124 In Part II, for example,
this Comment addressed the United States’ presence in Mexico through
its active assistance in oral advocacy training and education. Through

122. Wright, supra note 26, at 366.
123. See Lee, supra note 21, at 66–67.
124. See Mérida Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, www.state.gov/j/inl/merida (last
visited Feb. 29, 2013).
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USAID programs in which Mexican legal professionals and students
learn oral advocacy at American law schools, as well as the United Statesfunded training programs in Mexico, Mexican law students and professionals
are bound to be exposed to American legal principles during the course
of their trial advocacy education.
As a natural result of this constant contact, some evidentiary principles
central to the United State Federal Rules of Evidence may inevitably be
introduced through the various transactions between a teacher of the
United States adversarial system and a Mexican student. Due to the fact
that many evidentiary principles act as safeguards independent of each
other, a Mexican trainee may find certain principles useful and apply
those principles individually in practice to ensure the presentation of
evidence in a fair manner for the criminally accused. If such principles
were widely utilized in practice, such principles would be informally
incorporated into various state codes of criminal procedure, along with
the evidentiary principles that are already present.125 Thus, the rules
would be formally codified, though not necessarily in the form of a separate
code of evidence.
Furthermore, Mexico is leaving an inquisitorial system and American
sentiment champions everything that is “not inquisitorial.”126 The United
States’ legal system is both staunchly adversarial and anti-inquisitorial,
and thus by default represents everything that Mexico’s new system
means to achieve.127 While Mexico is not intentionally embracing the
United States criminal justice system directly, it may do so inadvertently
by gradually embracing the very characteristics that prominently define
the United States legal system. United States criminal procedure is strictly
adversarial in its aversion to stereotypically inquisitorial concepts.128
If Mexico were to embrace this similar line of anti-inquisitorialism in
its haste to adopt an adversarial system in all its states, it may incorporate
major adversarial concepts featured in the American adversarial system.
The process of presenting and objecting to evidence during trial advocacy,

125. As seen in Section B of this Part, these evidentiary principles are not fully
developed, but are sometimes present in state codes of criminal procedure.
126. See David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634,
1636 (2009).
127. Id. at 1635–36.
128. Most countries—including many Latin American countries that have similarly
made the transition to an adversarial system—incorporate a “mixed” system with some
inquisitorial and some adversarial features. Id. at 1683.
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so integral to the adversarial process, plays a significant role in the
American legal system.129 Thus, Mexico may similarly find that codified
rules of evidence are essential to its ancillary goal of promoting anti
inquisitorialism.
3. Addressing the Problem of Using the United States as a Model
Simply Because the United States May be the Most
Accessible Adversarial Model
Despite the fact that some influence by the United States on Mexico
seems inevitable, Mexico is in danger of confusing its bilateral cooperation
with the United States with “Americanization.” The United States is the
adversarial system that is most accessible to Mexico. Although some
influence by the United States on Mexico is inevitable, for the same reasons
described, it is imperative that Mexico maintains the development of its
own adversarial system and not merely adopts a replica of the American
version of adversarialism.
Thus far, however, it appears that Mexico is successfully retaining the
features that are distinct to its legal framework. It has opted to retain its
civil law tradition and not transition to a common law system, for example,
although the common law plays an integral part in the United States’
legal identity. For practical reasons, Mexico has also opted not to incorporate
jury trials, another integral part of the United States’ legal identity—as
well as a defining feature of the American adversarial system. It seems,
therefore, that despite a significant amount of obvious influence from the
United States, Mexico is developing an adversarial system of its own.
V. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS TO CHILE
Chile is an example of a Latin American country that successfully
transitioned from an inquisitorial system to an oral adversarial system.130
Like Mexico, one of the primary goals of the Chilean transition to
democracy was to reform its criminal justice system to protect fundamental
human rights by establishing basic due process into its criminal
proceedings.131 Chile’s transition to an adversarial criminal justice system
supplemented its transition to a democracy after the brutal dictatorship

129. See, e.g., id. at 1643 (discussing the defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses).
130. This Comment will examine Chile, as opposed to the other Latin American
countries that made the transition to an adversarial system, as it is considered a strong
example of effective and successful reform.
131. See Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousino, Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems:
The Rule of Law and Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 SW. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 323, 328 (1998).
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of General Augosto Pinochet ended in 1990.132 Chile’s inquisitorial
system, under the Pinochet dictatorship, permitted numerous human rights
violations at the hands of its police agencies and had a rampant reputation
for injustice.133 Like Mexico, this led to a widespread public distrust and
lack of confidence in the Chilean judicial system by its citizens.134
However, Chile’s transition is considered a successful legal reform
effort—in that it successfully implemented the adversarial system in all
of its states—whereas many other Latin American countries have not yet
achieved the same level of success in their legal reforms.135 In particular,
Chile has achieved its success without implementing a formal code of
evidence. While this may seem to suggest that Mexico could similarly
achieve a successful transition without a formal code of evidence, many
Chilean experts believe that Chile is in a state of continuing education—
even post-transition—and that formally codified rules of evidence can be
essential to its continuing success. Thus, this section will introduce Chile’s
transition to an adversarial system, propose a formal code of evidence for
Chile, and present why leading Chilean reform experts believe in the
functionality of separately codified rules of evidence.
A. The Chilean Transition to an Adversarial System
Chile adopted a new code of criminal procedure in 2000 to reflect its
transition to an adversarial system after the end of the Pinochet
dictatorship.136 By July 2005, the country fully completed the
implementation of its reforms, which have been considered the most
successful out of all Latin American countries.137 Two different countries
primarily influenced the Chilean reforms: Germany and the United
States.138 Although both countries have an adversarial system, Germany
retains a civil law tradition whereas the United States follows a common
law tradition.

132. See James M. Cooper, Proyecto Acceso: Using Popular Culture to Build the
Rule of Law in Latin America, 5 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 378, 379 (2008).
133. See id.
134. See Cousino, supra note 131, at 326.
135. James M. Cooper, Competing Legal Cultures and Legal Reform: The Battle of
Chile, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 501, 520–21 (2008).
136. Cristián Riego, Oral Procedures and Case Management: The Innovations of
Chile’s Reform, 14 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 339, 340 (2008).
137. Cooper, supra note 132, at 379.
138. See Cooper, supra note 135, at 507.
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This dual foreign influence differentiates Chile’s transition to an
adversarial system from that of Mexico’s transition. Chile benefited
from being able to look to the German adversarial system and civil law
tradition, which included all of the positivist values that Chile’s own
legal framework so highly regards.139 Therefore, the ease with which Chile
applied Germany’s adversarial system to its own criminal proceedings, was
likely a contributing factor in Chile’s successful reforms.140 By contrast,
Mexico’s sole influence in transitioning to an adversarial system is the
United States. Consequently, as Mexico retains its civil law tradition, its
positivist values are often at odds with the United States common law
system’s emphasis on case law and legal precedent—creating an additional
challenge that Mexico must overcome to make a successful transition.
Germany’s presence and influence on Chile began in the nineteenth
century, far predating the Chilean reforms. 141 In fact, the Chilean
government turned to Germany, not the United States, for assistance
when it drafted a new Criminal Procedure Code.142 The German Agency
for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) has been assisting with the implementation
of rule of law in Chile through education and training since 1998.143
GTZ is also planning to assist in Chile’s civil procedure reforms.144
The United States Embassy is also involved with Chilean legal reform.
Since 1995, the Embassy has partnered with two organizations, Fundación
Paz Ciudadana and Proyecto ACCESO, as well as American law schools, to
help educate and train Chilean legal professionals in preparation for the
implementation of oral trials.145 Similar to the efforts of USAID and the
Mérida Initiative in Mexico, continuous education and training are
imperative to the long-term success of the Chilean reforms. Thus, even
though the Chilean criminal reforms were fully implemented in 2005,
both the German and American organizations have maintained their
presence in Chile to continue working to ensure the ongoing success of the
adversarial system.146

139. See id. at 527–32 (discussing Germany’s influence in the drafting of Chile’s
new criminal and civil procedure codes.) Like Mexico, Chile’s positivism and the civillaw tradition similarly support codified rules of evidence.
140. See id. at 532. Interestingly, despite all of the similarities, Germany does not
have a public defender role in its adversarial system. Id.
141. Id. at 527.
142. Id. at 530.
143. Id. at 502.
144. Id. at 531.
145. Id. at 540.
146. Any Chilean aversion to globalization will not be discussed in this Comment.
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B. The Case for a Code of Evidence in Chile
Unlike Mexico, where public prosecutors are firmly embedded into its
criminal procedure, the role of the prosecutor is relatively new to Chile,
having not been introduced to the criminal system until 1997.147
Whereas the Mexican prosecutor must overcome its notably diminished
role in the new adversarial system, Chile was free to newly develop and
define the role of its prosecutors.148 Before the introduction of the Public
Prosecutor’s office, only the due process judge—the juez de garantía—
was responsible for investigating and producing the evidence at trial
against the criminal defendant.149
Similar to Mexico’s public prosecutor under its inquisitorial system,
Chile’s due process judge was susceptible to abuses of power due to a
lack of checks and balances. 150 The due process judge, prior to the
introduction of the public prosecutor, was virtually unconstrained in his
or her investigative capacity and in making evidentiary determinations
without significant limitations.151 Even after the initial introduction of
the public prosecutor, Chilean criminal procedure remained an inquisitorial
process. The lack of checks and balances in Chile’s criminal justice system
was remedied only after its transition to an adversarial system and the
introduction of the role of the public defender.152
Still, the changeover to a diminished role for the judiciary has been
challenging for Chile as due process judges sometimes inadvertently revert
to their old roles and insert themselves into the gathering of evidence
during the investigatory phase, thereby changing the dynamic of the
adversarial system to favor the prosecution.153 This is especially problematic
for the public defender, who depends on the due process judge to make
impartial evidentiary determinations during oral trials.154

147. CÓDIGO PROCESAL PENAL [CÓD. PROC. PEN.] [Chilean Criminal Procedure Code]
art. 137 (Chile).
148. However, the role of the public defender was not introduced until 2000, as
part of the adversarial system. Cousino, supra note 131, at 332.
149. Id. at 325.
150. Id. at 325–26.
151. CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL [CÓD. PROC. PEN.] [Chilean Criminal Procedure
Code of 1906] arts. 153–83, 19 de Febrero de 1906 (Chile).
152. CÓD. PROC. PEN. art. 137 (Chile).
153. Cousino, supra note 131, at 348–49.
154. Id. at 329.

451

DANG (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE)

1/26/2018 1:57 PM

Unfortunately, much like the Mexican due process judge, the Chilean
due process judge is free to make evidentiary determinations at his or her
own discretion, without having to abide by any definitive guidelines.155
The language of the Chilean Penal Process Code is virtually identical to
the language from the Chihuahua Code of Criminal Procedure from Part
IV of this Comment. Under Article 297 of the Chilean Penal Process Code,
the Chilean due process judge may freely assess the evidence, but cannot
contradict the principles of logic, maxims of experience, and scientific
knowledge.156 Like the Mexican due process judge, the broad standard
implied by the statutory text is not enough to provide any meaningful
guidance or restraint on a Chilean due process judge who chooses to abuse
his or her power. Thus, the current Chilean criminal procedure is still
nevertheless susceptible to the misuse of evidence against a criminal
defendant at trial due to the lack of safeguards keeping the due process
judge in check. Once again, a separate code of evidence is a viable solution
that would restore the checks and balances to evidentiary determinations
and bring further transparency to Chilean criminal procedure.
C. Chilean Reformers Support the Implementation of
Formally Codified Rules of Evidence
While Chile’s success indicates that a formal code of evidence is not
necessary for Mexico to successfully transition to an adversarial system,
Chile nevertheless faces the same need for a safeguard against potential
abuses of power in evidentiary determinations by the due process judge.
Both Chile and Mexico, through broad statutory text, give the due process
judge sole discretion over determining the admissibility of evidence. A
formal code of evidence would address this need by establishing guidelines
for the due process judge, standardizing evidentiary determinations from
courtroom to courtroom, and bring further transparency to each country’s
criminal proceedings. Interviews with Chilean reform experts reveal that
they believe that a formal code of evidence would greatly supplement
Chile’s post-transition success in upholding the goals of its reform.
Professor James M. Cooper, the director of Proyecto ACCESO, has
attempted to implement a separate code of evidence in Chile since the
introduction of the adversarial system.157 Despite his involvement in the
education and training of Chilean reforms, and despite the fact that he
himself has drafted multiple codes of evidence as possible starting

155. CÓD. PROC. PEN. art. 276 (Chile).
156. CÓD. PROC. PEN. art. 297 (Chile).
157. Interview with James Cooper, Dir., Proyecto ACCESO, in San Diego, Cal. (Nov.
13, 2012).
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points, Chilean officials have regularly rebuffed him.158 He attributes
this negativity and resistance to further reformation as a result of “reform
fatigue,” but nevertheless sees the opportunity for improvement.159
However, he optimistically believes that Chile will eventually incorporate a
formal code of evidence because it is the most practical solution to
maintaining effective due process in its new criminal procedure.160 This
outlook suggests that formally codified rules of evidence are an inevitable
supplement to Mexico’s new criminal procedure regardless of its
implementation before, during, or after the initial transition.
Sr. Claudio Pavlic, the former National Public Defender of Chile,
believes that while the lack of codified rules of evidence makes the task
of criminal defense more challenging than it already is, Chile is not yet
in a position to create a formal code of evidence.161 Like Mexico, Chilean
criminal procedure already utilizes certain evidentiary principles, some
of which are codified within its Penal Process Code. Although these
principles are significant to the trial process, Sr. Pavlic believes that the
amount of evidentiary principles are currently so few and far between
that Chile could not compile a code of evidence rules without further
development.162 However, that is not to say that he believes a code
of evidence is not fundamental to the continuing improvement of Chile’s
criminal procedure—he does acknowledge its importance to effective
due process in the courtroom—only that it is simply not currently a viable
option.
Furthermore, the evidentiary principles that Sr. Pavlic considers most
important to criminal procedure are already codified in the Penal Process
Code, even if a separate code of evidence is nonexistent.163 Article 276
of Chile’s Penal Process Code, for example, states that the due process
judge will oversee the investigation and collection of the evidence.164
Additionally, Articles 295 and 296 introduce the principle of relevancy,
which was similarly important to Mexican criminal procedure and
incorporated into its code of criminal procedure.165 These are the
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. E-mail from Claudio Pavlic, former National Public Defender, Chile, to Connie
Dang, Law Student, Univ. of San Diego (Nov. 15, 2012, 08:00 PST) (on file with author).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. CÓD. PROC. PEN. art. 276 (Chile).
165. CÓD. PROC. PEN. arts. 295–96 (Chile).
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evidentiary principles identified by Sr. Pavlic as rules that are significant
to Chilean oral advocacy.166 It makes sense then, in light of Chile’s own
inherent positivism, that these rules must be codified somewhere in order
to effectively carry out due process.
However, there is room to further develop these evidentiary principles.
The concept of relevancy, for example, is still vaguely defined in
comparison to the United States Federal Rules of Evidence. Article 297
of Chile’s Penal Process Code, introduced above, is again problematic as
it only sets out scant guidelines that the due process judge must abide by
in making evidentiary determinations.167 A separate code of evidence
would not only compile all existing evidentiary principles, but would
allow each principle to be fully developed and better defined.
In light of Chile’s reform efforts, Mexico should at least consider
codifying within its criminal codes those evidentiary principles that it
finds most significant to its oral trial process—but only until it can work
towards implementing a formal code of evidence. Both the opinions of
Professor Cooper and Sr. Pavlic seem to confirm that, while Chile’s
transition is considered complete, the possibility for further reforms
remains. The continuous education of Chilean legal professionals suggests
that the reformers are still refining Chilean criminal procedure. If Chile
still acknowledges room for reform, then certainly Mexico should strive
towards eventually developing a formal code of evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
A formal code of evidence, though a lofty objective, would greatly
supplement Mexico’s 2008 constitutional reforms and achieve many of
its reform goals. The evidentiary principles under its inquisitorial system
were ineffective, condoned human rights violations, prone to corruption
and abuses of power, and not transparent to the public. The reforms aim
to ensure a fair trial for criminal defendants by drastically changing
Mexican criminal procedure. Yet, at the evidentiary stage, there are still
ambiguities and possible misuses of evidence that would prevent a criminal
defendant from receiving a fair and impartial trial. Formally codified rules
of evidence would address these issues by providing checks and balances
during pre-trial evidentiary determinations, establish standards and guidelines
for the due process judge, and make transparent the process of determining
whether evidence is admissible.
The Mexican reforms must work within its civil law tradition and its
positivist values. Formally codified rules of evidence make sense in that
166.
167.
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the evidentiary principles that already exist in trial are written into the
statutory law and uniformly utilized within its courts. While Chile’s
successful transition to an adversarial system without a formal code of
evidence suggests that codifying evidentiary principles are not necessary
to successfully achieve reforms to criminal procedure, its post-transition
state of continuing education and refinement suggest that it is still in the
midst of its reformation. Thus, Mexico must similarly remain forwardlooking in its goals and work towards eventually implementing formally
codified rules of evidence.
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